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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), which imposes a moratorium on
state and local taxes on Internet access and prohibits "multiple and
discriminatory" state and local taxes on electronic commerce, has been
extended until November 1, 2003, but the debate on whether and how to
tax electronic commerce has not ended. This paper is intended to assist
clear thinking about the taxation of electronic commerce. Under an eco-
nomically neutral sales tax, all sales to consumers would be taxed, all sales
to business would be exempt, and sales by local merchants and by
remote (out-of-state) vendors would be taxed equally. A compliance-
friendly sales tax would exhibit substantial simplicity and interstate uni-
formity in the tax base, legal framework, and administrative procedures.
Existing sales taxes exhibit none of these characteristics. Many sales to
The author wishes to thank James Poterba and Walter Hellerstein for comments on an
earlier draft.116 McLure
consumers are exempt, many sales to business are taxed, and, because
of the Supreme Court decision in Quill, which is based on the complexity
of the system, many sales by remote vendors are not taxed. The system
is extremely complex, in large part because there is essentially no unifor-
mity from state to state. Under the Streamlined Sales Tax Project the
states have recently begun serious efforts to simplify their sales taxes, by
making them more nearly uniform, in hopes of gaining Congressional or
judicial reversal of Quill. These efforts would substantially simplify the
system, but would not achieve economic neutrality, as many sales to
consumers would remain exempt and many sales to business would still
be taxed. Moreover, differences in tax bases, legal frameworks, and
administrative procedures would remain. Technology (lookup tables
that categorize products as taxable or exempt in each state) might be able
to handle differences in tax bases, but not those in legal structures and
administrative procedures.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) imposes a moratorium on state and
local taxes on Internet access and prohibits "multiple and discrimina-
tory" state and local taxes on electronic commerce. Initially enacted in
1998, the ITFA has been extended until November 1, 2003.1 Unlike the
"naked" extension of the ITFA that was enacted, some proposals for
extension would have significantly restricted the taxing power of state
and local governments, while others would potentially have expanded
that power. The temporary extension of the ITFA did not definitively
resolve the choice between these options, which wifi continue to be
debated until at least the end of October 2003. This paper is intended to
assist clear thinking about the taxation of electronic commerce.2
1The ITFA (which also created the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, to be
considered in section 5), was part of the Omnibus Appropriations bill. It expired briefly, its
timely extension a victim of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the anthrax
scare that followed. The Act's pre-emptive effect is more symbolic than real, except in the
case of taxes on Internet access, since (1) the Act has virtually no effect on sales taxes that
do not discriminate against e-commerce and (2) decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court (to be
considered in section 4) already effectively eliminate taxation of many e-commerce sales to
consumers. The symbolism has at least three facets: the emergence of e-commerce as a
politically favored sector, the victory of anti-tax forces, and Congressional intrusion into
fiscal decisions of state and local governments.
2Electronic commerce is "the use of computer networks to facilitate transactions involving
the production, distribution, and sale and delivery of goods and services in the market-
place." This definition, from Abrams and Doernberg (1997), is more useful than that in U.S.
Treasury Department (1996, ¶3.2.1), the crucial part of which is". .. the exchange of goods
or services ... using electronic tools and techniques." TheTreasury definition does notThinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce117
The current debate over the taxation of electroniccommerce in the
U.S. reflects basic defects in the way state and localgovernments tax
sales and corporate income more than the inherent difficultyof taxing
most electronic commerce. For the most part, the advent of electronic
commerce has highlighted problems that were there all along; it didnot
create them. Most of these problemsbut not allstem from the lackof
uniformity of the taxes imposed by the states (and the Districtof Colum-
bia) and their numerous political subdivisions. Pointingto that lack of
uniformity, the U.S. Supreme Court has said, most recentlyin the 1992
Quill decision (504 U.S. 298), that a state cannot requirea remote (out-of-
state) vendor to collect its sales tax unless the vendor hasa physical
presence in the state.3 Since the states have not solved these problems
cooperatively by increasing uniformity, despite having had ampleoppor-
tunity and incentive to do so, some believe that it wouldbe appropriate
for the Congress to mandate a solution. Otherswarn that this is a step
that should not be taken lightly, lest the fiscalsovereignty of the states
be unduly compromised. They fear that Congress mightlegislate solu-
tions to state problems where noneare needed or impose inappropriate
solutions; in any event, there would be unprecedented federalinterven-
tion in the fiscal affairs of state and local governments. Givenrecent state
efforts to find a solution, they counsela wait-and-see attitude, to allow
the states time to simplify their systems. Some believethat the Congress
should have signaled that it would relax the physical-presencerule if the
states significantly simplify their sales tax systems.
Section 2 describes how a state sales tax that iseconomically neutral
and relatively easy to comply with (hereafter theeconomically neutral
and compliance-friendly system) would be structured,indicates how exist-
ing sales taxes deviate from thatnorm, and discusses the effects of
those deviations. E-commerce, perse, plays a minor role in the discus-
sion, which is equally applicable to sales by othertypes of remote
vendors. It is perhaps best seen, alternatively,as a catalyst for long-
overdue action by state and local governments to simplifytheir taxes or
as a stalking horse for those who would undermine the taxingpower of
the states.
clearly differentiate what is commonly known as electroniccommerce from such activities as
telemarketing and television shopping, whichare excluded by the AbramsDoernberg
definition. This paper, does, however, exclude financial services from itspurview.
Strictly speaking, remote vendors that have nexus ina state are required to collect the use
tax, which is legally imposed on the in-state purchaser's use of the purchaseditem, rather
than the sales tax, which is imposed on in-state sales andcannot be collected on sales
originating outside the state. Except where required for clarity, this distinctionis generally
ignored in favor of the generic term "sales tax."118 McLure
Section 3 summarizes arguments that have been madefor and against
exempting e-commerce from taxation and suggeststhat little revenue
would be affected by the choice of whether to tax e-commerce.Section 4
describes key elements of recent proposals to accompany extensionof the
Internet Tax Freedom Act. Section 5 describesthree prior attempts to find
a solution to the problemof whether and how to tax e-commerce. Section
6 compares three approachesthe naked extensionthat was enacted and
two alternativesto reforms required to achievethe economically neu-
tral and compliance-friendly system. The Appendix discussesapplication
of business activity taxes, which include corporate income taxesand fran-
chise taxes measured by income, to remote commerce.It discusses design
issues and describes defects of the current system.It is substantially less
detailed than the discussion of sales and use taxes, in partbecause the
latter is where most of the current debate has focused.
2. AN ECONOMICALLY NEUTRALAND
COMPLIANCE-FRIENDLY SALES TAX4
It is generally agreed that taxes should, to the extentpossible and consis-
tent with other goals, be economically neutraland compliance-friendly.5
2.1 A Neutral Sales Tax
A state sales tax that was economically neutral would taxall consump-
tion occurring in a state equally. A tax on all consumptionis economi-
cally neutral in ways specified below. Moreover, tothe extent private
consumption and consumption of public services arecorrelated, such
taxes can be seen as consistent with thebenefit principle of taxation,
which requires that taxes be related to benefitsreceived from public
services. Finally, taxing all consumption is simplerthan taxing (or ex-
empting) only selected products; this is explained furtherbelow. A state
sales tax that satisfied this basic design objective would taxall consump-
tion in the state; tax no sales to business; and taxsales by local and
remote vendors equally.
I have described this system and its rationale in greater detail invarious publications,
including McLure (1997), (1998a), (1998b), (2000a), (2000d), and (2001b).
Some may object that the rules of optimal taxation, ratherthan economic neutrality,
should guide tax policy. Those rules, which call for differentialtaxation of products,
depending on the elasticities of demand and supply for the products,generally ignore the
administrative difficulty of implementation, as well as the factthat a vast amount of
information is required to put them into practice. See Slenirod (1990).On the other hand,
not taxing business inputs, which is generally consistentwith the conclusions of Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971), is relatively easy to implement.Thinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce119
Economists emphasize the neutrality of such a system, which would
not discriminate between types of consumption, would not distort
choices of techniques of production and distribution, wouldtreat local
and remote vendors the same, and would not distort the location of
economic activity. The increased efficiency of markets that is generated
by e-commerce arguably makes achievement of the conditions foreco-
nomic neutrality even more important than before.
2.2 Administrative Tractability
If the requirement that remote vendors collect tax is not to beonerous,
and thus an unconstitutional burden on interstatecommerce, the sales
and use tax must be made "elegantly simple."6 Simplicity, inturn, re-
quires substantial uniformity of the sales and use taxes of all states.
Moreover, clear de minimis nexus rules and realistic vendor discounts
(rebate of taxes intended to cover part of the costs of compliance) would
eliminate or substantially reduce compliance burdenson remote vendors
making only small amounts of sales intoa state.
2.2.1 Interstate Uniformity A uniform tax base, a uniform legalstruc-
ture (i.e., uniform statutes, regulations, and interpretations), and simpli-
fied administrative procedures (e.g., "one-stop" registration, filing,etc.
for all states) would simplify compliance. Uniformity of the tax base has
many dimensions, including uniform definitions of products; uniform
classifications of products as taxable or exempt; uniform treatment of
tax-exempt sales to business, to non-profit organizations, and togovern-
ments; uniform tax-exemption certificates; and conformity of state and
local tax bases in a given state. Uniform tax rates would not be required;
states would retain complete control over tax rates, which is the key to
fiscal sovereignty and not a source of complexity, at least forstate taxes.
Under this system a vendor in San Jose, California (or in Tallahassee,
Austin, or anywhere else), being familiar with the tax law of itsown
state, could easily calculate the tax due on sales to customers inany
other state, simply by knowing three things: (1) Is ita taxable sale to a
consumer or an exempt sale to business (or to a non-profit organization
or a government)? (2) Where is the purchaser located? (3) What is the
applicable tax rate? The vendor would not need to contend with inter-
state differences in such matters as the definitions of taxable andexempt
products, exempt sales to business, exemption certificates for salesto
6This is the term Governor Mike Leavitt of Utah used in his address to the Inaugural
Meeting of the Implementing States of the Simplified Sales Tax Project, held in Salt Lake
City on November 28-29, 2001.120 McLure
business, non-profits, and governments, or details of taxlaws; by as-
sumption these would be the same in all states.
2.2.2 The Simplicity of Taxing All Consumption and OnlyThatLittle
has been said in the current debate about the need to tax all consump-
tion and exempt all sales to business. (What has beensaid has usually
focused on the political difficulty of taxing services and the reductionin
the tax base and thus revenuesand the need to increaseratesthat
would result from exempting sales to business.) Since these tworeforms
do not figure in the Quill decision, why emphasize them? Isit only a
question of economic neutrality?
Consider the statement abovethat "a vendor ...,being familiar with
the tax law of its own state, could easily calculate the tax due onsales to
customers in any other state. ..." The condition stated in italics would
be adequate to guarantee simplicity of compliance with thelaws of other
states only if the tax bases (and the tax laws) ofall states were identical.
There are, of course, an infinite number of ways to define theidentical
tax base. But none (at least none that makesense) are as simple as the
rule under the economically neutral and compliance-friendly system,
which can be summarized in two rules.7 First, if a product is sold to a
household, tax it. Second, if it is sold to a business, a government, or a
tax-exempt organization, exempt it. Certainly thisapproach is far sim-
pler than basing the tax of each state on uniform definitionsof products
and of types of sales that could be either taxed or exempt8 or even on a
uniform base that differed from that under the economicallyneutral and
compliance-friendly system.
2.2.3 Nexus and Vendor Discounts Remote vendorsthat make only
small amounts of taxable sales into a state could face a significantburden
if required to collect the state's use tax. This burdencould easily be
avoided by exempting vendors from the duty to collect tax in states
where they do not have a substantial physical presenceand their taxable
sales fall below a de minimis level.9 (Stated differently, statescould
assert nexus only if a remote vendor had either asubstantial physical
presence or non-de-minimistaxable sales in the state.) This dual nexus
rule for remote vendors could be supplemented byrealistic vendor dis-
It would, of course, be simpler to tax all sales, whether to businesses or toothers. Such
turnover taxes have long been known to create unacceptableinequities and distortions.
8This essentially describes the approach of the Simplified Sales TaxProject, to be de-
scribed below.
States where such vendors are located could be allowed to tax such sales.Thinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce121
counts that compensate for the costs of tax collection, which are dispro-
portionately high for those making small amounts of sales ina state.
In applying the physical-presence prong of the dualnexus rule, the
physical presence of a dependent agent in a state could be considered
evidence of physical presence of the principal, asnow. But, contrary to
some state court decisions, so could the in-state presence of corporate
affiliates offering essentially the same products as the out-of-state entity.
(The presence of affiliates providing services suchas delivery, accep-
tance of returns, and repairs would presumably be evidence ofan
agency relationship and thus a physical presence.'°)
Sales of agents and affiliates would presumably be combined with
those of the principal or parent for purposes of the salesprong of the
dual nexus rule. Thus a corporation or corporategroup could not avoid
nexus by employing agents or legally separate affiliates to make sales.
The physical-presence prong of the dualnexus rule just described
contains a word not found in the nexus test the Supreme Court haspro-
videdthe word "substantial." This higher threshold for the physical-
presence test would not have the same negative implications for revenues
and the competitive position of local vendors as it would if merely added
to the present nexus rule, as it would be supplemented by the sales test.
Remote vendors that made a non-de-minimjs amount of sales in the state
would be found to have nexus, even if they had onlyan insubstantial
physical presence in a state.
2.3 Inevitable Administrative Problems
Several administrative problems would exist even under the economi-
cally neutral and compliance-friendly system.
2.3.1 Digitized Content The discussion to this point has focused im-
plicitly on commerce in tangible products. Aside from the difficulty of
sourcing sales to local jurisdictions (assigning them to jurisdictions of desti-
nation), to be discussed below, there is relatively little difficulty in sourcing
sales of tangible products, since the vendor generally knows where the
products are shipped or delivered.1' The situation can be quite different in
10 The California Board of Equalization recently decided thatBorders.com could be re-
quired to collect use tax, although it has no physical presence in the state, because its
parent (Borders) acts as its agent in accepting returns in exchange for cash refunds. For
further discussion of "entity isolation," see McIntyre (1997).
Gifts of tangible products constitute an exception to this generalization. But the basic
questionwhether to assign gifts to the jurisdiction of the donor or that of the recipient
is, in the first instance, more a philosophical issue than an administrativeone. Assignment
to the jurisdiction of the donor is probably simpler.122McLure
the case of digitized content, which is directed to an e-mailaddress. In this
case the vendor may not knowand mayhave no reliable way to learn
where the buyer is located. It may be possible to use the billingaddress as a
proxy for the "ship to" address, but at somerisk of manipulation.12
It is worth noting that this is the first time this discussionhas touched
upon an issue that is unique to electroniccommercethat is, one that is
not also present in traditional mail-order business.
2.3.2 Local TaxesThe discussion to this point has also focused on
state sales taxes. In fact, local governmentsalso levy sales taxes. This
creates the need to determine the local taxrate(s) that should be ap-
plied to sales by remote vendors and the locality (orlocalities) that
should receive the revenue from tax on such sales.13Provided an exact
match of addresses and taxing jurisdictions is not required, itshould be
possible to overcome this problem in one of several ways,for example,
by relying on nine-digit ZIP codes. Alternatively, atthe cost of even
less precision, remote vendors might be allowed toemploy a blended
rate that reflects the average of all local rates in agiven state, relying on
the state to divide revenues among local jurisdictions.(This approach
would not survive judicial scrutiny under current law, because itwould
impose an unconstitutional burden on interstateshipments to local
jurisdictions with tax rates below the blended rate. The Congress,act-
ing pursuant to the Commerce Clause, couldrelax this constraint.) Of
course, in either event itwould be essential that the tax base and the
legal and administrative framework for local taxesbe identical to those
for state taxes.'4
2.4 Existing Deviations from the EconomicallyNeutral and
Compliance-Friendly System
The existing state sales taxes violate all of theprinciples of economic
neutrality stated above and are extremely complex. First, the taxesdo not
12 For a more detailed discussion, see Eads et al. (1997).
13 Varian (1999) has suggested that, because of the difficulties of implementing local sales
taxes, local governments should abandon the sales taxin favor of the local income tax.
McLure (2000b) argues that while Varian might be correctif the nation were starting de
novo to create a system of tax assignment, the costsof transition to such a system seem too
great to make it a viable alternative. Because of commutingbetween taxing jurisdictions, a
local income tax, which could be imposed on the basis of residence,would probably track
benefits of public services more closely than a local payroll tax, whichwould ordinarily be
based on employment.
14 A vendor that had nexus in a state would presumably have nexus for all local use taxes
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apply to all consumption; most services are exempt,as are a variety of
tangible products (with the exemptions varying from state to state).15
Second, the taxes apply to a wide range of sales to business; it has been
estimated that, depending on the state, as much as 20-70 percent of
taxable sales are not made to consumers.'6 Third, there is essentiallyno
uniformity in any aspect of state sales taxes.'7 Moreover, some 2,300 local
jurisdictions levy sales taxes, not all of which conform to the tax baseor
other provisions of the state tax of the state where they are located and
some of which administer their own taxes. States provide few de minimis
rules, and vendor discounts generally do not offset compliance costs,
especially for small vendors. Fourth, because of this complexity,a state
cannot compel a vendor to collect its use tax unless the vendor has a
physical presence in the taxing state.
The existing system creates economic distortions in all the dimensions
identified above. It favors the consumption of untaxed products; since
many of these are services, the exemptions favor the more affluent, who
consume disproportionately large amounts of services. Because many
business inputs are taxed, it distorts choices of production and distribu-
tion techniques. It discriminates against local vendors. It distorts the
location of economic activity (favoring remote vendors and producers
who are not subject to tax on their inputs). This distortion is aggravated
by entity isolation, the use of legally separate entities to avoid having
nexus in a state.'8 Moreover, the de facto inability to tax remote sales to
consumers implies that, for a given tax rate, revenues will be lower than
if the tax applied to all purchases from remote sellers. Unfair competition
from remote vendors and loss of tax base have received the greatest
attention in the recent debate.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF EXEMPTING
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Over the past several years many arguments have been heard for and
against taxing electronic commerce. These are reviewed here, followed
by a review of estimates of the revenue implications of the choice.
15 See Due and Mikesell (1994).
16 See Ring (1999).
'For a more complete description of interstate differences in tax bases, see Due and
Mikesell (1994). Cline and Neubig (2000) tell horror stories involving interstate differences.
McLure (2001b) calls the current system a "Great Swamp."
18 On entity isolation, see McIntyre (1997).124 McLure
3.1 Arguments against Taxing Electronic Commerce
Arguments for not taxing e-commerce take several forms, some of which
are intertwined with arguments for exemptingall remote sellers from a
duty to collect use tax.
One line of reasoning might be characterized as an "infantindustry"
argument: that e-commerce should experience a period of tax exemption
in order to allow it to "get on its feet." Several years ago,when it
appeared that e-commerce would swallow the entire economy, the case
for a tax subsidy on these grounds was not persuasive.19 Now that e-
commerce has "cratered," despite the de facto existenceof that subsidy
for many sales to consumers, the wisdom of the policy is even more
suspect.
According to the "digital divide" argument, electronic commerce in
general, and Internet access in particular, should be tax-exempt in order
to avoid burdening low-income families, for whose childrenInternet
access may represent an important way outof poverty. The general
argument for exempting e-commerce is not persuasive, as affluentfami-
lies spend far more on electronic commerce than do poor ones. The more
limited case for exempting all charges for Internet access is also not
compelling, since the ostensible objective could be achieved by exempt-
ing only basic service. Besides favoring affluent households, exempting
all Internet access invites Internet service providers to "bundle" content
with basic service. The difficulty of distinguishing between basic and
19Advocates of exempting e-commerce have badly misrepresented the implications of
the work of Austan Goolsbee. Goolsbee's conclusion that taxing e-commercewould cause
a reduction in the amount of e-comrnerce is not reasonenough to exempt e-commerce; a
similar conclusion could be reached for a tax on almost any product or form of commerce.
What is required is evidence that there is some form of external benefit (e.g., network
externalities) that should be subsidized by exemption. Given current levels of usage of
the Internet (or even the levels of a few years ago), it is hard to believe that significant
network externalities remain unrealized. Thus, Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999, p. 424),
state, "The major network externalities are likely to exhaust or at leastdiminish once the
Internet achieves major scale. Too often, infant industry protection turns into established
industry protection. Further, we expect that eventually there wifi be an important nega-
tive network externality... increasing Internetcongestion. ... The congestionproblem
is likely to get worse as the Internet grows and it argues against subsidizing thegrowth
rate through tax policies." Similarly, testifying on behalf of theCongressional Budget
Office, Thomas Woodward (2001) has said, "Network externalities arising from additional
users, however, occur primarily in the early stages of a network'sgrowth. At this point
in the Internet's development, there appears to be few external network benefits to be
garnered from additional users. ...Effectively exempting remote purchases from sales
taxes is an indirect and unevenly focused means of promoting the Internet'sgrowth that
is unlikely to bring significant benefits in terms of additional users or uses." See also
Zodrow (2000, 2002).Thinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce125
enhanced services could be sidestepped by limiting the exemption toa
given dollar amount per month, say $25.
Advocates of exempting electronic commerce have adopteda theory
advanced by the mail-order industrythat remote vendors should
not be required to collect tax because they do not benefit from ser-
vices provided by the states where their customers are located. This
argumentand counter-arguments that implicitly accept the validity of
its basic premiseconfuse the issue by focusing on services provided
to remote vendors, which should be essentially irrelevant. The point is
that purchasers pay the sales tax and it is to them that states provide
services; the remote vendor would merely collect the tax. There is no
reason to believe that a consumer of a given product consumes fewer
state services simply because the product is bought from a remote
vendor.
Some cite the threat of competition from foreign vendors as a reason to
exempt e-commerce. This threat is clearly far greater for digitized con-
tent than for tangible products. First, the cost of international shipping
would limit the threat in the latter case.20 Second, sales tax on tangible
products could, in principle, be collected at customs or the postoffice. (In
fact, the lack of incentive for the federal government or the Postal Ser-
vices to collect the tax and the complexity of state and local sales taxes
makes this solution problematic.) By comparison, digital contentcan be
"shipped" without significant cost, and it does not stop at thecus-
tomhouse or the postoffice. This highlights the need for international
cooperation in the taxation of e-commerce.21 At the very least, coopera-
tion must encompass all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and it may need to extend well
beyond that.
Yet another argument against taxing e-commerce involves holding
Main Street merchants hostage in order to gain lower taxes. Thereason-
ing is that if e-commerce (or all remote commerce) is not taxed, represen-
tatives of Main Street will pressure state and local governments to lower
taxes, so that they wifi not be at so great a competitive disadvantage.
The basis for one argument for not extending the present sales tax
system to electronic commerce (or to any form of remote commerce)-
20 The cost of shipping cannot, however, justify not taxing imported products,as has been
argued in the case of interstate mail order. To the extent that the tax exemption subsidizes
shipping that would not otherwise occur, it causes resources to be wasted.
21 On the taxation of electronic commerce in the European Union,see McLure (2001a). On
the way globalization limits national sovereignty in taxation, see McLure (2001c).126McLure
namely, the complexity of the systemis indisputable. This does not, of
course, mean that e-commerce vendors should notcollect a tax that is
dramatically simplified.
3.2 Arguments for Taxing Electronic Commerce
Arguments for taxing electronic commerce are based on equity, economic
neutrality, revenue (or lower tax rates), and simplicity of compliance and
administration.They are, however, predicated on the assumption that
the system is simplified substantially. Neither equity nor neutrality
would be furthered by requiring remote vendors to collect tax in the
absence of simplification.
There are several strands to the equity argument for taxing e-
commerce. Perhaps most important, it is unfair to exempt remotesellers,
including those involved in electronic commerce, from the duty to collect
a tax that local merchants mustcollect. Also, it is unfair to exempt
e-commerce purchases, which are madedisproportionately by the rela-
tively affluent, while taxing purchases from local vendors, made dispro-
portionately by the less affluent.
The neutrality argument for taxing e-commerce is implicit in the earlier
description of an economically neutral system and the distortions of the
existing system. Two aspects of the additional distortions that would be
created by exempting all e-commerce deserve special mention. First,
many products can be delivered in either atangible or an intangible
(digitized) form. Exempting the latter would tilt choices toward that
form of delivery. Second, given the "footloose" nature of many aspects
Woodward (2001) makes most of these points. The objective of taxing electronic com-
merce like traditional commerce has been endorsed by the U.S. TreasuryDepartment
(1996), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001), and Senator
Wyden, one of the original sponsors of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, who has included
these words in 5. 288:
As a matter of economic policy and basic fairness, similar sales transactions should be
treated equally, without regard to the manner in which sales are transacted, whether in
person, through the mails, over the telephone, on the Internet, orby other means.
More than 100 academic tax specialists endorsed the "Appeal for Fair and Equal Taxation of
Electronic Commerce," which the author submitted to the Advisory Commission on Elec-
tronic Commerce at its meeting in San Francisco in November 1999. The Appeal, which is
reproduced in McLure (2000a) and (2000d), contained the following language:
Electronic commerce should not permanently be treated differently from other com-
merce. There is no principled reason for a permanent exemptionfor electronic com-
merce. Electronic commerce should be taxed neither more nor lessheavily than other
commerce.Thinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce127
of electronic commerce, exempting sales made by remote vendors would
aggravate distortions of locational decisions.
Given the complexity of the present system, it may come as a surprise
that simplicity of compliance and administration is cited as an advantage
of taxing electronic commerce. Exemption of e-commerce in the content
of an otherwise radically simplified system would place a premium on
the definition of e-commerce and spur efforts to "shoe-horn" various
forms of traditional commerce into the exempt categoryand also ef-
forts to prevent thisthereby creating complexity.
3.3 How Much Revenue Is at Stake?
A few years ago state and local officials were issuing dire warnings that
their tax base would vanish into cyberspace. Even before the end of the
dotcom boom it came to be realized that these fears were vastly over-
stated.23
First, remote sales to business represent a large fraction ofe-
commerce. Some of these (e.g., sales for resale) are exempt, and tax on
much of the rest can be collected directly from the buyer, which risks
being audited, if the vendor does not remit the tax.
Second, some e-commerce transactions would not be taxable in any
event, because the products are exempt (e.g., food in many states and
services in most).
Third, some e-commerce sales represent a shift from traditional re-
mote transactions that would effectively go untaxed because of the
physical-presence nexus rule of Quill.
Finally, some e-commerce sales are by vendors who have nexus and
thus collect tax.
Chine and Neubig (1999) found revenue losses in 1998 from the failure
to tax electronic commerce to be only one-tenth of one percent of total
sales tax revenue. Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) estimated that revenue
losses in 1998 were less than one-quarter of one percent of sales tax
revenues and that in 2003 losses would be less than 2 percent of total
sales tax revenues. Bruce and Fox (2000) estimated losses in 2003 to be
about 1.5 percent of total state and local tax revenues; they did not
translate this figure into percent of sales tax revenues. Emphasizing the
uncertainty of any such estimates, the General Accounting Office (2000)
estimated that revenue losses for 2000 would be less than 2 percent of
total sales tax revenues and that in 2003 revenue losses would fall within
the range of 1 to 5 percent of total sales tax revenues.
See Cline and Neubig (1999), Coolsbee and Zittrain (1999), Bruce and Fox (2000), and
U.S. General Accounting Office (2000).128 McLure
4. EXTENSION OF THE INTERNET TAX
FREEDOM ACT
To understand the debate over provisions that might accompany exten-
sion of the ITFA, it is necessary to know a bit about nexus rules, the
judicial and statutory standards that determine whether a state can tax
income or require remote vendors to collect sales tax or pay business
activity taxes (BATs).24
4.1 Nexus for Use Tax Collection
Even before enactment of the ITFA in 1998, many remote e-commerce
sales were already effectively exempt from taxation. In 1967 (in National
Belas Hess, 386 U.S. 753) and again in 1992 (in Quill), the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the sales and use taxes imposed by the states are so
complicated that requiring remote vendors to collect the tax would im-
pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Onlyif the
vendor has a physical presence in the state can it be required to collect
tax. Although the buyer is legally liable to remit the tax on purchases
from remote vendors who lack nexus, few non-business purchasers actu-
ally do so.25 Thus the tax on sales made to consumers by many remote
vendors is, in effect, a voluntary tax that few pay.
Proposals for changes in the nexus rules affecting e-commerce fall into
three groups. Industry representatives favored a proposal that would
elevate the test of nexus for duty to collect use tax on remote sales from
"physical presence" to "substantial physical presence" and provide a list
of in-state activities that would not be deemed to constitute nexus. These
changes in the nexus standard would significantly restrict the taxing
power of state and local governments.
In response to the projected growth of e-commerceand thus of
effectively exempt salesmost of the states are participating in the
Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP), which is intended to simplify and
24 For a much more detailed discussion, see Hellerstein (1997).
Since the test of nexus under the Due Process Clause is not as high as that under the
Commerce Clause, states might be able to require remote vendors to provide information
on sales to their residents and use that information to collect tax from purchasers. Or states
might agree to collect this information for each other. Compared to collection of tax at the
time of sale, such an approach would be extremely inefficient and costly and would
probably not be worthwhile, except for big-ticket items. States where mail-order houses
are concentrated would face pressure not to participate in a scheme for exchange of infor-
mation. If such a scheme were put in place, it can be expected that states would compete
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modernize sales and use tax collection and administration; thenext
section describes the SSTP in greater detail. State and localgovern-
ments favored a legislative proposal that would, in effect, override
Quill for states that adopt the recommendations of the SSTP.26
The legislation actually enacted simply extends theITFA for two
years. It thus leaves the physical-presence nexus rule of. Quill intact,
without assuring the states that simplification would be rewardedby
relaxation of that rule.
4.2 Nexus for Business Activity Taxes
The Supreme Court has not applied to BATs thesame physical presence
test of nexus it applies to sales taxes. But in 1959 the Congress limited
state assertion of nexus by enacting P.L. 86-272, which prohibits taxation
of the income of a seller whose only business activity in thestate is
solicitation of orders (including solicitation by agents) for sales oftangi-
ble personal property to be filled by shipment from outside thestate.
P.L. 86-272 provides no protection for a corporation selling intangible
property in a state. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has thus ruled
(in Geoffrey, 437 S.E. 2d 13, cert. den. 114 5. Ct. 550, 1993) that the
presence of intangibles in the state creates nexus. Since the U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to grant certiorari in the case, other states have
sought to assert "Geoffrey nexus" in similar cases. There is considerable
concern in the business community that this legal doctrine could be used
to justify income taxes on out-of-state e-commerce firms selling intangi-
bles. To prevent this from happening, one proposal would extendthe
protection of P.L. 86-272 to sellers of intangible products and applyto
business activity taxes a newly enacted "substantial physicalpresence"
test of nexus (which would clarify that the presence of intangibleassets
in a state would not constitute nexus).
26On August 17, 2001 the governors of 42 states sent the following letter to all membersof
Congress:
August 8, 2001
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS:
If you care about a level playing field for main street retail businesses and localcontrol of
states, local governments, and schools, extend the moratorium on taxing Internetaccess
ONLY with authorization for the states to streamline and simplify the existingsales tax
system. To do otherwise perpetuates a fundamental inequity and ignoresa growing
problem.
The governors of California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, NewHamp-
shire, New York, and Virginia did not sign the letter, which is available at
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislafiveUpdate/1,1169,cLEnER-D46600htJ130McLure
5. PRIOR EFFORTS TO FIND ASOLUTION
Over the past several years several groupshave attempted to find a
solution to the problems posed by the advent ofelectronic commerce,
especially in the sales tax area; one of these efforts continuesand seems
to offer the best hope for a solution.
5.1 TheNTA Project
In 1997 the National Tax Associationconvened a large group represent-
ing business, state and local government,and "others." Virtually all of
the business representatives were from the e-commerceand high-tech
sectors; other, "traditional" business interests wereessentially unrepre-
sented. (There seems to be a presumption that it isrepresentatives of the
industries that would be affected who shouldbe asked about tax policy
in this area. Not surprisingly, they haveresponded that they would
rather not pay income taxes or collect use taxes.)
The NTA Project met periodically for two years.From the outset the
Project focused on a possible "compromise" involving greatersimplifica-
tion of the sales and use tax in exchange for anexpanded duty to collect
tax on remote sales. The Project consideredonly "broad brush" reforms,
such as uniform definitions of potential elementsof the tax base (that is,
uniform definitions of products that might be taxed or exemptin a given
state), the sourcing of e-commerce transactions,and technological fixes
such as processing by credit-card companies; it neverconsidered the
many details of complianceand administration the SSTP has addressed,
much less more radical reforms, such as theeconomically neutral and
compliance-friendly system described earlier, which weredeemed to be
beyond its frame of reference. Because of strict rulesthat demanded a
substantial qualified majority to make a decision, the Project wasunable
to reach a consensus on recommendations.Even so, the Project served
the useful purpose of identifying issues and increasingmutual under-
standing among the various parties represented.27 Onesticking point
that deserves notice was concern that governmentrepresentatives might
attempt to parlay business agreement to anexpanded duty to collect use
taxes into a lower nexus threshold for businessactivity taxes. (See also
the Appendix.)
27 The Final Report of the NTA Project is available at http://ntanet.org/. It does not seem
unreasonable to attribute part of the states' continued interest insimplifying their sys-
tems to greater appreciation that the potential complianceproblems cited by business are
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5.2 The Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce
The Internet Tax Freedom Act created the Advisory Commission on
Electronic Commerce, which was charged with making "a thorough
study of Federal, State and local, and international taxation and tariff
treatment of transactions using the Internet and Internet access and
other comparable intrastate, interstate or international sales activities."
While members of the Advisory Commission ostensibly represented
state and local governments, traditional business, and consumers, as
well as the e-commerce and high-tech sectors and the federal govern-
ment, in fact the membership was packed with members who opposed
taxation of e-commerce.28
At the end of the day it was only the combination of the requirement
for a two-thirds majority for the adoption of a "finding or recommenda-
tion" and the unwillingness of the federal representatives to go along
with the opponents of taxation that prevented the Advisory Commission
from forwarding to the Congress proposals that, if adopted, would have
drastically reduced the taxing powers of the states. Even so, the Advi-
sory Commission forwarded the following "majority policy proposals."29
First, a five-year exemption for digitized content downloaded from the
Internet and "their non-digitized counterparts." This proposal would ef-
fectively exempt recorded music, videos, books and magazines, games,
and software from taxation.
Second, codification of the Quill decision regarding nexus for use tax
purposes and provision of safe harbors that would prevent corporate
affiliation, repairs, and returns from being construed as evidence of a
physical presence in the state.
Third, application of the physical-presence test of Quill, extended as
described above, to nexus for business activities taxes.
Fourth, a suggestion that the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) be asked to draft a uniform sales
and use tax act that would include: (1) uniform tax base definitions; (2)
uniform vendor discount; (3) uniform and simple sourcing rules; (4)
one sales and use tax rate per state and uniform limitations on state
rate changes; (5) uniform audit procedures; (6) uniform tax returns!
forms; (7) uniform electronic filing and remittance methods; (8) uniform
exemption administration rules (including a database of all exempt en-
tities); (9) a methodology for approving software that sellers may rely
On this, see McLure (1999).
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on to determine state sales tax rates; (10) a methodology for maintain-
ing revenue neutrality in overall sales and use tax collections within
each state.
5.3 The Streamlined Sales Tax Project
Forty of the 45 sales tax states are currently involved in the Streamlined
Sales Tax Project (SSTP), 35 as voting participants and 5 as non-voting
observers. The SSTP, in the words of its Executive Summary:
is an effort created by state governments, with input from local governments
and the private sector, to simplify and modernize sales and use tax collection
and administration. The Project's proposals will incorporate uniform defini-
tions within tax bases, simplified audit and administrative procedures, and
emerging technologies to substantially reduce the burdens of tax collection.
The Streamlined Sales Tax System is focused on improving sales and use tax
administration systems for both Main Street and remote sellers for all types of
commerce.3°
On December 22, 2000 state representatives to the SSTP voted unani-
mously to approve the Uniform Sales and Use Tax Administration Act
and the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. The Uniform Act
would authorize the taxing authority of the state "to enter into the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement with one or more states to
simplify and modernize sales and use tax administration in order to
substantially reduce the burden of tax compliance for all sellers and
for all types of commerce." The Agreement contains the many details
of simplification and uniformity. The National Conference of State Leg-
islatures (NCSL) endorsed the Act and Agreement on January 24, 2001,
but only after making modifications that significantly reduce the im-
plied simplification. (Among the items deleted pending further re-
view are uniform definitions of items in the tax base and limitations
on tax rate caps, thresholds, and sales tax holidaysall provisionsthat
are important for simplification.) To date 22 states haveapproved some
form of the legislation, and legislation has been introduced in 7 more
states.31
3°This description is from the Executive Summary of the SSTP, available at http://
208.237.129.206/sline/execsum.pdf.
3°Links to the Uniform Sales and Use Tax Administration Act and the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement, issue papers that explain the SSTP proposals, and a map show-
ing the status of legislation are available at http://www.geocities.com/stream1ined2000/
and at http://www.nga.org/nga/salestax/1,1169,,00.html. McLure (forthcoming) examines
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The key features of the Streamlined Sales Tax System developed by
the SSTP include32:
Uniform definitions of products. Legislatures will still be able to choose
what is taxable and exempt, but wifi use common definitions for broad
groups of products (and a few more narrowly defined products, such
as soft drinks). State and local governments in a given state wifi use
the same tax base.
Simplified exemption administration. Proposals for simplification cover both
use- and entity-based exemptions. Uniform codes wifi be used for
exempt products.
Rate simplification. States will be encouraged to simplify state and local
tax rates. States will accept responsibility for notice of rate and bound-
ary changes.
State administration of local taxes. States wifi be responsible for the adminis-
tration of all state and local taxes and the distribution of revenue from
local taxes to local governments.
Uniform sourcing rules. The states will have uniform sourcing rules for all
property and services.
Simplified"one-stop" online registration and uniform returns. Vendors would
be able to register simultaneously in all participating states and file
uniform returns.
Uniform audit procedures. Sellers who use one of the certified technology
models described below either will not be audited or wifi have an audit
that is limited in scope, depending on the technology model used.
Reliance on technology. The states would jointly certify software to be used
to calculate the tax imposed by each sales tax jurisdiction. A vendor
could use such software to calculate and remit its own tax, or it could
rely on a certified service provider (CSP, called a "trusted third party"
in earlier descriptions of this approach) to calculate and remit its tax.
Alternatively, vendors could rely on proprietary software that had
been certified by the states.
Paying for the system. To reduce the financial burdens on sellers, states
will assume much of the financial burden of implementing the Stream-
lined Sales Tax System.
32Other simplifications would include standardized geographic coding, limited frequency
and required advance notice for changes in tax rates and jurisdictional boundaries, limita-
tions on the use of caps and thresholds in defining tax bases, requirement that tax holidays
employ standard definitions of products, uniform provisions for bad debts, and uniform
rounding rules. Where there are differences between the original SSTP proposals and
those approved by the NCSL, the former are described.134McLure
The system being developed by the SSTP is a political compromise
between simplicity and state sovereignty. It would substantially reduce
complexity. But it falls short of the uniformity and simplicity of the eco-
nomically neutral and compliance-friendly system described earlier,
largely due to the desire to retain state control over many of the parame-
ters of sales tax policy.
Rather than proposing a uniform tax base, the SSTP proposes uniform
definitions of what might be taxed or exempt, leaving to each state the
choice of whether or not to tax each identified item. Moreover, it
achieves relatively little uniformity in the treatment of sales to business.
To handle interstate differences in the tax base, the Project would rely
heavily on technology, essentially comprehensive lookup tables that cate-
gorize products as taxable or exempt in each state.
Rather than proposing a legal and administrative framework that is
uniform from state to state, the SSTP would leave the existing structure
unchanged, except in particular ways. Thus vendors and CSPs will still
face interstate differences in statutes, regulations, and interpretations
and in administrative procedures.
6. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
6.1 Summary
The economically efficient sales tax system described earlier can be summa-
rized in three rules: First, all sales to consumers would be taxed. Second,
all sales to business would be exempt. Third, sales by local and remote
vendors would be taxed equally.
A compliance-friendly sales tax would exhibit substantial simplicity and
uniformity. Uniformity would extend to the tax base, to statutes, regula-
tions, and their interpretation, and to administrative procedures, which
would be drastically simplified. Remaining compliance costs would be
mitigated by de minimis rules and vendor discounts.
Existing sales taxes exhibit none of these characteristics. At present
many sales to consumers are exempt, many sales to business aretaxed,
and many sales by remote vendors are not taxed. The system is ex-
tremely complex, in large part because there is essentially no uniformity
from state to state. States make little use of de minimis rules, and vendor
discounts are inadequate to compensate for compliance costs.
In recent years the states have begun serious efforts to simplify their
sales taxes and make them more nearly uniform. These efforts would
substantially simplify the system, but do not go as far as the eco-
nomically neutral and compliance-friendly system. Many sales to con-Thinking Straight about the Taxation of Electronic Commerce135
sumers would remain exempt, and many sales to business would still
be taxed.
6.2 Analysis of ITFA Options
As noted earlier, proposals for extension of the ITFA fell into three
groups:
Extension only. The legislation that was enacted leaves many remote
purchases by consumers effectively untaxed, with obvious implica-
tions for equity, efficiency, and revenues. It maintains pressure on
states to simplify their systems, in hopes of gaining approval (from the
Supreme Court or the Congress) of an expanded duty to collect use
tax, but does not provide any assurance that the requisite approval
will be forthcoming if simplification is achieved.
Government position. State and local governments favored a proposal that
would authorize interstate cooperation to simplify sales and use taxes,
promising that if such cooperation is forthcoming, the physical pres-
ence test of nexus would be replaced (for cooperating states) with one
based on the volume of sales a remote vendor makes in a state. It
would have been more conducive to economic neutrality, equity, and
simplicity than the legislation actually enacted.
Business position. Business favored a proposal that would prohibit state
assertion of nexus unless a remote vendor has a "substantial physical
presence" in the taxing state and lists activities that would not consti-
tute a substantial physical presence. This proposal would have elimi-
nated tax on many sales; to the extent it achieved simplicity it would
do so at the cost of economic neutrality, equity, and revenue. Some
industry proposals also would have extended the expanded nexus test
to BATs, further undermining state revenues, especially where states
have adopted the sales-only apportionment factor or do not require
unitary combination. (On this, see the Appendix.)
6.3 Postscript
On November 28-29, 2001, after the conference where this paper was
presented, the "implementing states" of the SSTP held their inaugural
meeting to chart the way forward. The proceedings of that meeting
suggest that the states take seriously the need to simplify their sales and
use taxes, in part because they realize that, if they fail to achieve real
simplification by the time the ITFA expires again on November 1, 2003,
the Congress may simply extend the ITFA permanently, without consid-
ering elimination of the physical-presence test of Quill.136McLure
APPENDIX: BUSINESS ACTIVITY TAXES
Whereas the debate on sales and use taxes has, from the outset, involved
an attempt to gain agreement on a compromise thatwould combine
simplification and an expanded duty to collect use tax, what little debate
has occurred on business activity taxes has been limited to the question
of nexus. (Business representatives would like to see the physical-
presence nexus rule of Quill, perhaps expended as described in the text,
applied to BATs; they fear that if they agree to a compromise on nexus
for use taxes, states wifi attempt to stretch the parameters of that compro-
mise to assert nexus for BATs.) But this is an extremely narrow view of
the problem; nexus must be considered simultaneously with other as-
pects of BATs if a reasonable result is to be reached.33
AJ Issues in the Design of State Business Activity Taxes
Unlike the state sales tax, the state corporate income tax and related
forms of BATs cannot easily be justified under any accepted principle of
taxation. The benefit principle does not provide a fully satisfactory justifi-
cation, as it is hard to argue that the only businesses that benefit from
public services are those that are incorporated, that only profitable corpo-
rations receive such benefits, or that benefits are proportionate to taxable
profits. The "squishy" view that states are "entitled" to tax income that
has its source within their boundaries fares only a little better. Perhaps
the best approach is to be pragmatic, recognizing that the purpose of
state corporate income taxes is to tax income that originates in the
state.34 Attempting to implement this "standard" encounters several
obstacles and raises a number of issues that must be considered along
with nexus rules.
A.1.1 Formula Apportionment Corporate taxpayers do not employ geo-
graphically separate accounting which attempts to measure the income
that originates in each state, and requiring them to do so, besides being
impractical, would be conceptually suspect and subject to abuse. First,
because of the economic interdependence between parts of a corpora-
As Dan Bucks, Executive Director of the Multistate Tax Commission, has said, "One
cannot study business activity nexus separate from the rest of the structure of corporate tax
or franchise taxes. Nexus standards interact with apportionment formulas and with report-
ing methodsand by reporting methods, I'm talking generally about combined reporting
versus separate-entity corporate reporting. And the overall issue is very complex, and it
really involves looking not just at nexus, but looking at an entire structure of the corporate
taxes." Public testimony before the NCSL, reported in Sheppard (2001).
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied a looser test: tax must be "reasonably related" to
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tion operating in various states, it is conceptually impossible to isolate
the income originating in each state. Second, corporations could manipu-
late transfer prices for transactions between parts of the corporation
operating in different states to shift net taxable income to low-tax states.
To overcome these problems states use formulas to apportion the total
income of a multistate corporation among the states where it operates.
For many years most of the states used a standard formula that assigned
equal weights to three apportionment factors: payroll, property, and
sales (at destination). More recently there has been a decided shift to-
ward using only sales to apportion income, so that now "sales only" is
the most common formula. It appears that this shift has occurred as part
of an attempt to attract economic activity, not because it is thought to
produce a better measurement of income originating in the state.
A.1.2 Unitary CombinationIf each member of a corporate group is
taxed as a distinct entity, manipulation of transfer prices and economic
interdependence make isolation of the income of the various entities
problematic. To overcome these problems some states combine the activi-
ties of related corporations deemed to be engaged in a "unitary busi-
ness" in order to determine the income of corporations doing business
within the state. Under unitary combination transactions between mem-
bers of the unitary group (e.g., sales, interest payments, and dividends)
are ignored and the total domestic income of the group is apportioned
among the states according to the apportionment factors of the entire
group.35 Only a minority of states employ combination, despite its mani-
fest advantages, and those do so do not all employ the same definition of
a unitary business.
A.2 Defects of the Present System
The present system exhibits the following characteristics.
A.2.1 Inconsistent Nexus Rules and Apportionment FormulasIt is
readily apparent that the nexus rule of P.L. 86-272 and the sales-only
apportionment formula are logically inconsistent; if merely having sales
in a state does not create nexus and only sales are used to apportion
income, substantial amounts of income may escape taxation. The incon-
sistency of the two rules can result in substantial loss of revenue, espe-
cially when a state does not combine the activities of corporate affiliates
engaged in a unitary business; an out-of-state corporation could have
During the 1980s some states' application of unitary combination on a worldwide basis
created considerable international consternation and controversy. That practice has now
ended and is not considered here.138McLure
significant sales in a stateincluding one where it has affiliateswithout
having nexus.36 Enactment of the physical-presence test of Quill would
exacerbate this problem.
To some degree individual states suffer from a problem they have
created and could correct acting alone. That is, a state could minimize
the damage to its revenues by requiring unitary combination and avoid-
ing the sales-only apportionment formula. (By comparison, the inability
to assert nexus for use tax is the result of the collective inability of the
states to simplify the system and thus cannot be overcome by any indi-
vidual state acting alone.) But this would not eliminate the loss of tax
base that occurs when a corporation meets the standards of P.L. 86-272
(or that would occur under the "substantial physical presence" test of
nexus). This could be avoided by replacing P.L. 86-272 with a de minimis
nexus rule based on the in-state presence of significant amountsof the
apportionment factors (as well as the existence of a significant amount of
apportionable income)
A.2.2 The Lack of Uniformit,'Such a reform would expose many more
corporations to liability for BAT in states where they have no physical
presence. This would accentuate compliance problems caused by thelack
of uniformity of such taxes unless the relaxation of nexus rules were
accompanied by simplification. A simplified system might exhibit the
following forms of uniformity, some of which are analogous to those of
the economically neutral and compliance-friendly sales tax system: first,
a uniform definition of apportionable income (presumably based on the
federal definition of taxable incomep with such adjustments as are re-
quired by combination); second, application of unitary combination,
based on a uniform definition of a unitary business; third, a uniform
apportionment formula, based on uniform definitions of apportionment
factors; fourth, uniform statutes, regulations, and interpretations; and
fifth, simplified administrative procedures ("one-stop" registration, fil-
ing, etc.). As under the economically neutral and compliance-friendly
sales tax system, states would retain complete control over tax rates.
There is currently a lack of uniformity especially in the application of
unitary combination and the choice of apportionment formulas. This
creates both complexity and the possibilities of over- and undertaxation.
Because of reliance on federal concepts, there is somewhat more unifor-
mity of legal and administrative standards than in the sales tax field.
For further discussion of inconsistencies between these provisions, see Mazerov (2001).
This argument is developed more fully in McLure (2000c).REFERENCES
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